Same as it ever was: The Canadian and American music industries’ responses to digitization and the circulation of “piracy panic narratives” by Kribs, Kaitlyn
Stream: Interdisciplinary Journal of Communication 
2020, Vol 12(1), 53–69 
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
http://journals.sfu.ca/stream 
 
 
 
Same as it ever was: The Canadian and American music 
industries’ responses to digitization and the circulation of 
“piracy panic narratives” 
 
Kaitlyn Kribs 
Joint Program in Communication and Culture 
York University/Ryerson University 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I outline how the “piracy panic narrative” (Arditi, 2015) has             
repositioned the fan/musician dynamic in the digital era, from one between maker            
and listener to one between labourer and thief. The paper questions if the press has               
fairly assessed the fan/musician dynamic in the digital era and examines who has             
directly benefited from the reorganization of the relations between producer and           
consumer. The article provides a contemporary history of the American and           
Canadian music industries’ response to file sharing, crisis and piracy. Drawing on            
data from the 2017 Music Canada report on the Value Gap, the essay ultimately              
concludes that those most affected by the repositioning of the producer/consumer           
dynamic are not the various stakeholders whose voices are most frequently heard,            
but actually the musicians. The piracy panic narrative is thus nothing but an             
exercise in creating smoke and mirrors; music industries depict themselves as           
victims, all the while quietly rearranging their business practices to maintain a            
long-held position as gatekeeper. 
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On May 27, 1997, ​USA Today published what is now known to be the first               
media account of the unauthorized downloading of MP3 music files. In the article,             
journalist Bruce Haring (1997) recounts the ease with which young people enter            
queries into an “internet search engine” and locate websites offering (free) sound            
files “using a technique called MPEG Audio Layer 3”. He reveals that the popularity              
of such sites has “mushroomed on the Net” over the past few months, particularly              
among college students. Yet in spite of widespread industry misgivings about the            
circulation of MP3s (which to many key players at that time signalled a burgeoning              
sect of pirates-cum-entrepreneurs), Jim Griffin, then-director of technology at Geffen          
Records, is quoted as commending the MP3, arguing that despite current limitations,            
the online circulation of MP3s represents the “future of music distribution” (Haring,            
1997). 
So, what went wrong? In the intervening decades, scholars and critics have            
engaged in lively debates regarding the central post-Napster proposition: “the          
recording industry is dead.” In 2002, Steve Jones urged readers to consider why             
claims about the death of the Music Industry even seem possible, and to reflect on               
why such claims are often made with relish. As music industries rallied against             
file-sharing platforms and their alleged ability to supersede their long-standing          
gatekeeping initiatives, discourses from popular, trade, and critical press were          
chiming the death knell of the industry, and decrying fans as bootlegging thieves.             
This widely circulated “piracy panic narrative” reconfigured the relationship         
between producers and consumers, from musician and fan to victim and criminal            
(Arditi, 2015). But is that really a fair assessment of the fan/musician dynamic in the               
digital era? Who actually stands to benefit from this reorganization of the relations             
between producer and consumer? 
In what follows, I provide a close examination of the American and Canadian             
music industries’ responses to digitization and, more specifically, their hostile          
aversion to the availability and free circulation of MP3 files via peer-to-peer            
file-sharing networks. To begin, I define the Music Industry​, and provide a brief             
overview of the history of panic and piracy in contemporary music industries. The             
remainder of the article explains David Arditi’s (2015) “piracy panic narrative” and            
assesses the implications of its repositioning of the fan/musician dynamic.  
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Overall, this essay​1 charts the decades wherein the MP3 went from internet            
novelty to mainstay format. It begins with the American context because Napster is             
the emblem of the digital zeitgeist of the 1990s, and because it is in the United States                 
that Napster was created (and ultimately dismantled). The remainder of the article            
conceptualizes the various industry responses to digitization as a play in three acts.             
Act One covers the period where the piracy panic narrative emerges and when             
efforts to quash file sharing begin in earnest. Act Two focuses on the moment those               
efforts turned from stopping the sites that enable peer-to-peer file sharing to suing             
citizens characterized as prolific pirates. Finally, Act Three sees the revivification of            
the piracy panic narrative in Canadian cultural policy after several years of            
dormancy. Drawing on on data from the 2017 Music Canada report on the Value Gap               
and the 2019 Shifting Paradigms Report from the Standing Committee on Canadian            
Heritage on remuneration models for artists and creative industries, I ultimately           
conclude that those most negatively affected by the repositioning of the           
producer/consumer dynamic continue to be musicians. The piracy panic narrative is           
therefore nothing more than an exercise in creating smoke and mirrors: music            
industries depict themselves as victims, all the while quietly rearranging their           
business practices to maintain their long-held position as gatekeeper.  
 
1 ​This article is an early iteration of what has since developed into two chapters of my 
dissertation. In one chapter, I offer a more detailed account of the legal proceedings 
surrounding industry efforts to quash file-sharing practices between 1997 and 2007, in 
both the United States and Canada. I begin with the proceedings initiated by the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) that followed the popularization of Napster 
mentioned above and then cover the Canadian Recording Industry Association’s (CRIA) 
venture at an RIAA-style shutdown of peer-to-peer file sharing. This includes the BMG 
Canada Inc. v. John Doe lawsuit, Judge von Finckenstein’s contentious ruling, the CRIA’s 
appeal, and the CRIA’s eventual takedown of BitTorrent Tracker Demonoid. The second 
chapter is an in-depth examination of the key policies and reports that emerged in Canada 
between 2008–2019 to address changes wrought by digitization. In addition to the 
documents already mentioned in this article, I examine the Creative Canada Policy 
Framework (2017); Music Canada’s report on Closing the Value Gap (2019); and the 
Statutory Review of the Copyright Act (2019). The key themes discussed include copyright, 
safe harbour exemptions, the definition of a sound recording, and the radio royalty 
exemption. 
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Defining the Field 
Jacques Attali’s (1985) core argument in ​Noise: A Political Economy of Music is that              
music, as a cultural form, is intimately tied up in the modes of its production. These                
modes, he argues, are bound to structures that both enable and constrain creativity,             
and these structures shape the conditions of production experienced by the           
musician as well as the conditions within which relationships are created between            
musicians and audiences (Attali, 1985, p. 9). Jonathan Sterne (2012) explains that it             
is ​through the industrialization and commodification of music that the          
aforementioned relations are transformed from that of musician and fan into one            
between records and cash (p. 190). This relationship, of course, is exemplified by             
the Music Industry/musician/consumer dynamic. 
Ordinarily, evoking the term “music industry” conjures a mental image of a            
giant corporate monolith, one fixed in form and function—but it’s far more complex             
than this. Trying to make sense of these complexities, Matt Jones (2012) helpfully             
delineates the nuanced differences between three specific yet interrelated concepts:          
music industry, music industries, and the Music Industry. For Jones (2012), it is             
important to distinguish among these three ways of conceptualizing the production,           
circulation, and consumption of recorded music. ​Music industry ​is the “unstable           
mixture of entrepreneurial instinct” combined with “industrial and business         
latitude” held together by a “legal framework of contract and intellectual property            
law” (Jones, 2012, p. 5). The term “music industry” best captures “the mass or              
repeated actions made by record companies, music publishers, and live agents”           
(Jones, 2012, p. 5). It is, in essence, the business ​practices and procedures that make               
up the industry devoted—at least in some way—to music production, distribution,           
and consumption. The term indicates the doing of actions and processes by music             
industries ​and​ the Music Industry (Jones, 2012).  
Narrowing his focus somewhat, Jones (2012) uses ​music industries to recall           
the specific practices and products of the music industry. The term encapsulates            
recording, publishing, and live performance; music commodity forms that can, and           
do, vary; and licenses (Jones, 2012). Music industries thus refers to the particular             
businesses involved in producing and distributing music commodities, and also those           
involved in licensing music and putting on shows. 
Finally, Jones (2012) characterizes the commonly shared perspectives and         
practices among industries involved in the publishing, recording and live          
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performance of music as ​the Music Industry​. This term expresses the interactions            
and interdependencies among these three distinct industries as both necessary and           
commonplace. Echoing what Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno long ago          
recognized, Jones (2012) argues that “the Music Industry exerts a standardizing           
cultural force” (p. 175); its impetus is the preservation of the Music Industry             
“standard” of expertise and the maintenance of the formulae that demonstrate           
guaranteed returns on investment. 
Some scholars attempt to eschew the invocation of such an ambiguous term            
by focusing on what they deem “the recording industry”—that is, those industries            
concerned exclusively with the sale and circulation of recorded music. However,           
within the era of 360-degree contracts and a waning dependence on physical music             
commodities, the notion of “the recording industry” fails to fully capture the            
complex actions and interactions concurrently taking place (Meier, 2017). Consider,          
for example, this shift in Canada: during the early aughts, the pre-existing Sound             
Recording Development Program changed its name to the Canada Music Fund           
(CMF); and the Canadian Recording Industry Association likewise changed its name           
to Music Canada. While seemingly minor semantic differences, these changes speak           
to a wider shift in the understanding and expectation of what constitutes music             
commodities: the recordings, the performer, and the licensing rights. 
 
Music Industries, Crisis & Piracy 
The history of music industries reveals battles over playback formats and tensions            
between recording companies and consumers who demand cheap or free music           
(Sirois & Wasko, 2011). These battles tend to disrupt the status quo, receiving an              
exorbitant amount of media attention and are regularly framed as moments of            
crisis.​2 In 1983, for instance, ​Rolling Stone ​printed an article titled “The Digital             
2 ​The concept of moral panic fits logically enough into a conversation about the piracy panic 
narrative, especially when considering the role of the news media and popular press in 
circulating these narratives. Indeed, the piracy panic narrative could be read as a form of 
moral panic, as the press and relevant corporate stakeholders consistently frame the issue 
of piracy as a matter of morality (e.g. “stealing music is theft and theft is bad”). However, 
moral panics are most often generated from issues that incite fear in the public (e.g. fear of 
muggings, terrorism, gangs, shootings, tainted Halloween candy, etc.); by contrast, the 
piracy panic narrative generates fear of the public. The piracy panic narrative is the most 
effective way to understand this particular issue because it recognizes the fact that, in this 
so-called crisis of industry, it’s the public who are characterized as “pirates” of intellectual 
property—a faceless mass to be feared. 
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Revolution: Will the Compact Disc Make LPs Obsolete?” (Knopper, 2010). Swap the            
words “MP3” and “CD” for “compact disc” and “LP”, and the article could easily be               
read as if it were written in 2003 — even 2013. Cognizant of the industry’s flair for                 
the dramatic, Simon Frith (1988) argues that “there is more to be learnt from the               
continuities in pop history than from the constantly publicized changes” (p. 12).            
Similarly, David Hesmondhalgh (2019) stresses the importance of recognizing         
contradictions within the cultural industries, of recognizing the presence of          
continuity ​and change; of structure ​and agency; and of exploitation ​and pleasure.            
While it is undeniable that change within cultural industries—including music          
industries—regularly occurs, it is important that we ask the extent to which these             
changes are actual epochal shifts, as there are many continuities that remain            
alongside much-celebrated change. Hesmondhalgh urges that scholars be wary of          
falling into a neophilic trap of innovation idolatry and, like Frith, encourages his             
fellow researchers to stay grounded by keeping a strong eye toward patterns of             
continuity ​and change throughout the history of specific cultural industries, such as            
music industries.  
Most often, these so-called crises are nothing more than the industries’           
failure to respond to the ebb and flow of industry and innovation. It is understood               
that changes in technology are what incite much of the piracy panic narratives that              
circulate in and among popular discourses about technology, digitization, and the           
music industry. Despite the music industries’ ability to overcome and adapt to many             
of the changes they’ve faced, technology nevertheless remains a steadfast          
contradiction within music industries as it simultaneously helps to propel the music            
commodity to the far reaches of the globe at the same time as it seeks to “destroy it                  
from its material core” (Sirois & Wasko, 2011, p. 338). While technological            
innovations have never fully or fundamentally reconfigured the interdependencies         
of music industries, digitization has arguably been the most transformative (Jones,           
2012). 
Digitization has had significant repercussions for the nature of the music           
commodity, and the Music Industry is therefore reconfiguring itself around the           
distribution, circulation, and presentation of digital music via online retail outlets,           
file-sharing services, and streaming platforms (Morris, 2015). Digitization therefore         
demands a sea change in the modes of selling music and compensating artists, as              
well as the policies and regulations for managing sound recordings. A key issue that              
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repeatedly inspires panic among the music industries, but one that has come to a              
head in the digital era, is their ability to maintain a monopoly over the means of                
distribution (Jones, 2002; Sirois & Wasko, 2011). Because music industries profit           
greatly by intervening in the exchange of music commodities—while at the same            
time investing little into the creation of those commodities—they have amended           
their approaches in the digital era to ensure they maintain their rent-seeking​3            
returns. As Leslie Meier (2017) explains, “the business logics and tendencies           
inherited from the old music industries still play a vital role in shaping the              
asymmetrical distribution of risks and rewards found in the contemporary music           
industries” (p. 53). They have reinserted themselves in the supply chain by shutting             
down or buying up existing (illegal) distribution platforms, receiving exorbitant          
licensing fees to allow access to their catalogues (i.e. Spotify), or by creating entirely              
new platforms (i.e. Tidal or Vevo).  
Ultimately, the technological changes undergirding the production,       
distribution, and consumption of sound recordings have not profoundly disrupted          
the steadfast economic practices of the old recording industry (Meier, 2017).           
Consequently, while the Music Industry spent significant resources decrying         
file-sharing and digital distribution for posing a threat to the value of recorded             
music, the reality of the situation is that inequalities have intensified in the presence              
of digital distribution, and that it’s often the musician that suffers, not the industry              
(Morris, 2015). As such, the Music Industry is still a field of—and site for struggle               
over—power: “the power to decide who controls effort and decides what efforts are             
appropriate to market success” (Jones, 2012, p. 204). 
 
Piracy Panic Narrative: A Play in Three Acts 
Simply put, the piracy panic narrative suggests the following: file sharing is piracy,             
piracy is stealing, and stealing hurts artists and labels; ergo, fans who download             
shared files are not simply accessing free music but rather stealing potential            
revenue from their favourite artists (Arditi, 2014). “By labelling file sharers as            
property thieves,” Arditi contends, “the piracy panic narrative constructs a          
3 Ursula Huws (2016) explains that, under the structure of platform capitalism, capital 
intervenes by taking a rent. That is to say, it takes a small percentage of profits from the 
exchange of goods on its platform. The platform is therefore an intermediary that links 
producers to consumers, but one that does very little active work beyond facilitating this 
link (e.g. Uber, Apple Music, Postmates, etc). 
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victim—the artist—and a victimizer—the fan” (p. xxii). But in so doing, musicians            
are pitted directly against their audiences, fans, and consumers; “that is, the people             
who already support [them]” (p. xxii). Meanwhile, the Music Industry assumes the            
role of empath, and positions itself as speaking to the needs of the affected              
parties—musicians. In reality, however, musicians are put in the uncomfortable          
position of, on the one hand, being forced to condemn the actions of fans who are                
freely (though illegally) circulating their music—and, on the other hand, being           
required to actively cultivate a monetizable fanbase via social media platforms in            
order to make a living. If the music industries hadn’t been given a platform by news                
outlets to lambaste file-sharers and denounce the illegality of file-sharing, “the           
discourse over whether file sharing is illegal may be different structurally. The            
problem is that the idea of piracy has become naturalized” (Arditi, 2015, p. xxiii).  
These digital production, distribution and consumption systems have        
actually enhanced, rather than undermined, the commercial position of most music           
industries firms; this reality directly contradicts the music industries’ claims,          
reflected in the “piracy panic narrative”, that they are experiencing financial turmoil.            
Arditi (2015) suggests that the piracy panic narrative was put forth by the             
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) in an effort to create political will             
for the state to regulate cultural production in favour of big business and was widely               
and uncritically circulated by mainstream news outlets. In the proceeding section, I            
describe the two major litigious initiatives undertaken by the RIAA to thwart the             
free circulation of MP3s and unpack some of the implications that have arisen as a               
result of the Value Gap this has generated.  
 
Act 1: RIAA vs. Napster 
On June 1, 1999, Shawn Fanning debuted Napster, an independent peer-to-peer file            
sharing service that allowed users to upload and download MP3s via a user-friendly             
interface (Witt, 2015). That same summer, Frank Creighton, then-head of the RIAA’s            
anti-piracy division, was first within the organization to officially recognize online           
file-sharing after being shown Napster at a board meeting. By October 7, 1999, there              
were 150,000 registered users trading 3.5 million files, and by October 27, Hilary             
Rosen, then-head of the RIAA, instructed the association’s lawyers to draft a            
complaint to Napster (Knopper, 2010). The RIAA then filed its first official            
copyright-infringement lawsuit against Napster in the US District Court in San           
Francisco on December 6, 1999. For its defence, Napster attempted to use the 1992              
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Audio Home Recording Act​4 and the 1984 Supreme Court precedent, Sony Corp of             
America v. Universal City Studios, “The Betamax Case”; if Sony can sell VCRs for              
people to record TV, Napster argued, the same logic should apply to their case. Judge               
Marilyn Hall Patel, however, disagreed with their argument, and Napster lost the            
case (Knopper, 2010).  
By July 2000, Napster was hosting almost 20 million users, and by October             
Fanning had struck a deal with German media giant Bertelsmann for $60 million             
dollars (Knopper, 2010). In the meantime, while Napster continued to face litigation,            
the company attempted to appeal Judge Patel’s verdict. In February 2001, the US             
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld Patel’s decision and the site was              
officially declared illegal (Knopper, 2010; Witt, 2015). Napster engineers then began           
blocking file names according to a list provided to them by the RIAA in March 2001,                
and by May 14, 2002, Napster had officially declared bankruptcy (Knopper, 2010). 
Throughout this time, the RIAA was given uninterrupted access to          
mainstream media to circulate their piracy panic narrative. Napster, unsurprisingly,          
was not. Without adequate opportunity to meaningfully engage with the RIAA,           
Napster was silenced out of the debate—and so, too, were fans and musicians alike.              
Without a competing voice in the argument, the RIAA received staunch political and             
legal support. Yet, after pushing around its weight to block the largest file-sharing             
site from continuing to operate, the RIAA hadn’t grown tired. Instead of adapting or              
amending their business models according to the technological changes occurring in           
front of them, they continued to rail hard against this cultural movement; the RIAA              
then shifted its attention from file-sharing sites to the individuals responsible for            
sharing them. 
 
  
4 The Audio Home Recording Act 1992 was designed to prohibit the unlawful recording of 
media by consumers, but lawyers for computer companies demanded an exemption, stating 
that consumers should have the right to back up material via CD-Rom. The exemption was 
fiercely opposed by the Music Industry but the lawyers representing them realized that the 
AHRA wouldn’t pass without the compromise, so they made it. Therefore, IBM and its ilk 
pay no royalties to the music industries for enabling users to record media files on their 
devices, nor did they install a chip to restrict the number of copies one can make. This was a 
crucial oversight, of course, and can be pointed to as one of the key reasons the Music 
Industry temporarily lost its stronghold over music circulation/distribution/consumption 
(Knopper, 2010, 160). 
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Act 2: RIAA vs. Consumers 
When Apple debuted iTunes on January 9, 2001 at MacWorld San Francisco, it             
created a viable space for record labels to sell digital music to eager consumers. Yet,               
in March of 2002, just five months after iTunes’ stable release date, the RIAA began               
suing its own customer base (Knopper, 2010). Uncomfortable with the turn that the             
war on piracy was taking, Hilary Rosen openly disagreed with the lawsuits, refusing             
to be the face of the campaign, and on September 7, 2003 she resigned in protest                
after 16 years of heading the organization (Witt, 2015). The RIAA then proceeded             
with “Project Hubcap,” a series of “educational lawsuits” designed to teach           
file-sharers that music piracy hurts the industry and, most importantly, musicians           
(Knopper, 2010; Witt, 2015).  
The lawsuits were futile, misguided and unproductive, doing little to deter           
piracy and recoup supposed losses. The RIAA initially targeted 261 individuals,           
requesting damages of up to $150,000 per song (Witt, 2015). These individuals            
included: single mothers, families without computers, senior citizens, children, the          
unemployed, and “people who’d been dead for months” (Witt, 2015, p. 160). One             
case in particular received significant media attention: Brianna LaHara, a          
12-year-old girl who lived in a New York City housing project, downloaded the             
theme song to ​Family Matters​, and was then subsequently sued and forced to settle              
for $2000 (Witt, 2015). These educational lawsuits were brought against a total of             
16,837 people, almost all of whom were average citizens with absolutely no            
connections to elite or entrepreneurial pirates (Witt, 2015).  
As of 2006, the industry had settled approximately 6000 suits, each           
averaging $3000-$4000 (Knopper, 2010, p. 351). While the RIAA and IFPI (the            
International Federation of Phonographic Industries) were publicly blaming        
file-sharing as the cause for a dramatic decline in CD sales, as early as 2005, the                
IFPI’s own annual report acknowledged that the “free market,” a recession, and a             
buying cycle were what contributed to the overall decline in revenues (Arditi,            
2015). By forcefully shutting down peer-to-peer file-sharing programs and suing the           
average citizens who used them, the RIAA demonstrated that what was at stake was              
not the availability of music online and the fair compensation of artists, but rather              
maintaining the existing “structure of profit-making in the recording industry”          
(Arditi, 2015, p. 116). Stephen Witt (2015) argues that the war on piracy ended up               
looking a lot like the war on drugs: “costly and probably unwinnable, even in the               
face of felony prosecutions” (p. 226). In the end, the lawsuit campaign had little              
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impact on the amount of copyrighted music that is illegally downloaded (Knopper,            
2010). 
 
Act 3: The Value Gap 
Steve Knopper (2010) suggests that it was the piracy panic narrative and the             
American industry’s litigious responses that were the real causes of the 2000s crash,             
reflecting a common pattern of resistance to change within music industries. “If we             
are to reimagine an alternative, better world for musicians and listeners,” writes            
Jonathan Sterne (2012), “we will need to look past both the old monopolies over              
distribution and exciting practices of peer-to-peer file-sharing for new models that           
support a robust musical culture, one not just based on buying and selling” (p. 28).               
He argues that piracy was a productive economic force and, while the recording             
industries frame it as a threat to capitalism, other industries benefit           
handsomely—consider consumer electronics, broadband, internet service      
providers, and other kinds of intellectual property rights holders (Sterne, 2012).           
The industry’s inaction up to 1997 is crucial, he continues, as it allowed other              
industries such as Apple to develop and organize around the online media            
environment. “In many respects,” notes Leslie M. Meier (2017), “the power structure            
inherited from the ‘old’ music industries remains intact in the era of digital             
distribution” (p. 154). In other words, while the industry cried poor, citing declining             
CD sales and the widespread circulation of illegally downloaded music, the music            
industries more broadly continued to reap the benefits of a system rigged in their              
favour. The piracy panic narrative actively pitted musicians and fans against one            
another, obfuscating the ways in which the Music Industry quietly benefited from            
the chaos. 
According to Jonathan Sterne (2012), the short-term loss of compact discs as            
property was overcome by music industry players who sought to maintain           
ownership and control over the means of distribution; after all, distribution is the             
main model for profit generation (Sterne, 2012). By 2009, the global music            
industries were in complete disarray, but at the same time were also beginning to              
capitalize on digital distribution. Sirois and Wasko (2011) identify this as yet            
another example of the Music Industry following rather than leading trends. In our             
current day, music industries actively exploit “new music through digital sales,           
including satellite radio and webcasting, ringtones, iTunes sales and subscription          
services” (Sirois & Wasko, 2011, p. 350). As artists and labels seek new directions              
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for revenue, the importance of viral videos, publishing rights, streaming services,           
and the festival touring circuit continue to grow (Witt, 2015). 
It is now commonly understood that streaming has become the official           
alternative to physical music sales and downloading; and as of 2018, streaming            
accounted for 60% of the music marketplace in Canada (Music Canada, 2019).            
Consequently, streaming platforms are fundamentally changing the way that         
consumers use and access their music by limiting users’ ability to share music and              
stopping them from playing it on an unlimited number of devices. While the             
industry is enthusiastic about the potential for the closed circulation and revenue            
generation offered by streaming, it has become quite clear that streaming didn’t            
solve everything. According to Stephen Witt (2015), music streaming platforms          
remain “perpetual money-losers,” spending unsustainable amounts to license        
content to attract early users. And despite all this spending on licensing, artists with              
millions of plays earn royalty cheques only in the hundreds of dollars—this is a              
Value Gap (Witt, 2015). 
According to Music Canada (2017), the core problem of the Value Gap is “a              
failure to provide fair compensation to creators for the use of their work”, and this               
has a significant and direct impact on the livelihoods of all musicians. “The Value              
Gap,” they continue, “is the result of how government policies were implemented            
around the world as part of [the] early digital landscape two decades ago” (p. 10). In                
other words, the rule books that govern the contemporary digital marketplace were            
drawn up “when it was virtually impossible to foresee how [things] would unfold             
and what consequences the new rules would have” (Music Canada, 2017, p. 10).             
Ultimately, Music Canada argues that there remains a gulf between the revenues            
derived from online platforms/services and the revenue returned to recording          
artists and labels. Their major complaint is not with illegal downloading services,            
however, but rather with services that enable user-uploaded content for streaming:           
YouTube. 
The most salient issue raised by Music Canada (2017) in its Value Gap report              
is that of the Safe Harbour Laws and Protections. The 1996 World Intellectual             
Property Organization (WIPO) treaties introduced Safe Harbours to exempt internet          
service providers (ISPs) and online service providers (OSPs) from liability when           
third-party users infringe on copyright through their services. The Safe Harbours           
were adopted in the 1998 U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and in the              
2012 Canadian Copyright Modernization Act. These provisions were put in place to            
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protect an unwitting ISP/OSP from being sued for enabling copyright infringement,           
as they are unaware of what takes place via their services. Ultimately, sites like              
YouTube and the internet providers that enable them to argue that they cannot be              
held responsible for what takes place on their networks/sites. In reality, however,            
they are fully aware that these practices are taking place, and they are more than               
happy to reap the benefits. YouTube, for example, allows user-uploaded          
copyright-infringed material to freely circulate on its sites, and it thereby generates            
massive advertising profits. Likewise, the ISPs selling high-speed bandwidth         
capabilities for the uploading, downloading, and streaming of copyright-infringed         
material also yield significant revenues. Music Canada (2017) rightly insists that           
these provisions possess the unintended consequences “of allowing a massive          
relocation of economic value from copyright ownership to ad-supported online          
platforms that purport to qualify for the hosting exemption” while in reality            
functioning as streaming services (p. 74); musicians forego copyright royalty          
payments to which they were entitled.  
Music Canada (2017) stresses that despite the fact that “more music than            
ever is being streamed”, musicians and other rights holders “are demonstrably           
worse off than they were in the pre-digital marketplace” (p. 12). In the 1970s, for               
example, roughly 4000–5000 new albums were released per year; by 2008, at the             
height of the Music Industry’s cry for help, approximately 105,000 new albums were             
released (Meier, 2017). A 2011 study conducted by Nordicity on behalf of the             
Canadian Independent Music Association (CIMA) found that individual artists in          
Canada earn an average of $7,228 per year from 29 hours per week of music-related               
work—that’s less than $4.80/hour (Music Canada, 2017). Therefore, despite an          
exponential increase in the output of new music, the average Canadian           
musician—and musicians more broadly, we can assume—continue to receive         
measly, unlivable wages.  
A large part of the problems stemming from the Value Gap are attributed to              
the adoption of digital media policy long before the digital media environment had             
fully crystallized. For example, consider WIPO’s 1996 Copyright Treaty and          
Performances and Phonograph Treaty. These treaties translated longstanding        
copyright protections for the digital environment but did so more than two years             
before either Google (1998) or Napster (1999) existed; YouTube didn’t even come            
along until 2005 (Music Canada, 2017). Additionally, the 1997 Copyright Act poses            
significant problems for musicians, and Music Canada (2017) has proposed that it            
be amended. The Radio Royalty Exemption, carved out in the Copyright Act, frees             
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commercial radio stations from paying royalties (other than a $100 nominal fee) to             
artists and/or record labels for “the public performance and communication of their            
sound recordings” on the first $1.25 million in advertising revenue they make            
(Music Canada, 2017, p. 7). Music Canada estimates that between 1997 and 2016             
the exemption cost artists and labels in Canada close to $140 million on lost              
potential revenue, and these losses will continue. Additionally, the definition of a            
sound recording as currently defined in the Copyright Act, “effectively exempt           
royalty payments to performers and creators (other than songwriters, composers,          
and the music publishers they partner with) when the recordings are included in a              
television or film soundtrack” (Music Canada, 2017, p. 7). As such, artists and record              
labels in Canada lose approximately $45 million in annual revenue as a result of this               
“legislative anomaly” (Music Canada, 2017, p. 7). It is important to note, however,             
that both the radio exemption and the contested definition of sound recording are             
indeed problems contributing to the Value Gap, but that these issues existed before             
the rise and fall of Napster and have little to do with digitization or file-sharing. 
But whose interests does Music Canada really represent? While it often           
sounds as though they’re coming from a position of artist solidarity, giving a voice to               
the otherwise voiceless musician, the input from and experience of the average            
Canadian musician is largely absent from these discussions. Over the past year, the             
Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage conducted a study on remuneration          
models for artists and creative industries, including rights management and the           
challenges and opportunities provided by new points of access for creative content.            
While it’s promising that artist remuneration models are getting their due attention,            
it was largely industry perspectives represented in the report. According to the            
Cultural Capital Project —one of the few non-industry participants actually invited           
to speak to the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage—the evidence and           
perspectives of participants outside of the industry were not well represented (de            
Waard, 2019). The Cultural Capital Project (CCP) report insists that the critical ethos             
of their submission was largely absent from the Shifting Paradigms report, a report             
that the CCP maintains “prioritizes the status quo recommendations that were           
collectively put forward by music industry representatives and lobbyists” (de          
Waard, 2019). The interests thus being served by the recommendations made in the             
report are, by and large, those of the industry. And let us not forget: as Michael Jones                 
(2012) explains, the impetus of the Music Industry is always to preserve its             
standard of expertise. 
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Finally, and, to me, most troublingly, is the revivification of the piracy panic             
narrative that has been circulated in these contemporary industry accounts. The           
Shifting Paradigms (2019) report paints the portrait of an industry still very much             
in crisis. It contends that “the rise of illegal file-sharing software and the advent of               
online streaming platforms have changed the ecosystem”, and these changes require           
action. It also insists that there is a somewhat urgent “need to combat piracy” within               
music industries, but also within the cultural industries more broadly, “by creating            
new rules and enforcing those already in place in the Copyright Act” (Canada, 2019,              
p. 16). I find it more than flummoxing that the powers that be are still flagging the                 
issue of piracy more than 20 years after the RIAA began their fruitless litigious              
battles. Despite the report’s thoughtful reflection on the need to amend existing            
policy structures to support the creation and remuneration of Canadian music, its            
conception of the core problems appears deeply flawed. So, while the Value Gap is a               
very real issue for musicians, the solutions put forward by the likes of Music Canada               
and the Shifting Paradigms report unfortunately reflect a desire to maintain the            
deeply entrenched gatekeeping mechanisms that the industry has used to create           
exorbitant profits for decades. 
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